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Abstract 
 The period between 1958 and 1980 was a dynamic era for American universities. 
These postwar years witnessed a boom in area studies, encouraged by federal assistance 
and support from philanthropic foundations. Middle Eastern studies benefitted from the 
post-Sputnik increase in federal funding, becoming a significant field during the 1960s. 
However, by the early 1970s, institutions that traditionally financed Middle Eastern 
studies began to withdrawal support for the field, ushering in an existentially threatening 
era of resource privation. In order to maintain centers of Middle Eastern studies, scholars 
and administrators in the field relied on oil wealth from Muhammad Reza Shah.  
 This paper analyzes the unique political dynamic of Middle Eastern studies 
created by the participation of the shah in the financial apparatus of the field. Beginning 
in the mid-1950s, the shah sought to create a network between the Iranian government 
and American universities by donating to centers of Middle Eastern studies. As the 
federal government and philanthropic foundations began to withdrawal their support for 
Middle Eastern studies, the network between the shah and American academics became 
more crucial for maintaining the regional studies centers. Further, during the 1970s, 
administrators and scholars of Middle Eastern studies increasingly turned to oil 
corporations in order to support the field. The relationship between the shah and Middle 
Eastern studies abruptly ended following the Iranian revolution. Finally, this essay should 
be read as an example of the dangers of private support for a field of high geopolitical 
significance. 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A Golden Land: Middle Eastern Studies, the Pahlavi-Pennsylvania Project, and 
Development in Iran 
 In 1979, United States government officials witnessed the fall of Muhammad 
Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran with shock. According to a retrospective report from the Iran 
Task Force, in 1978 the Carter Administration believed that “the Shah personally 
commanded wide popular support throughout the country,” failing to acknowledge the 
“revolutionary forces” that were to bring him down.  The Carter Administration, 1
according to this report, did not understand the extent to which Iranians resisted the 
absolute rule of the shah. Pahlavi, who introduced the so-called White Revolution to Iran 
in 1964, had encouraged westernization through measures such as land reform, 
development of educational institutions, and urban and rural modernization.  He further 2
developed the oil industry, using revenues to build his country’s military.  Despite these 3
perceived economic advances, in 1977 the rule enjoyed by the shah began to crumble due 
to nation-wide protests, culminating two years later in the expulsion of Pahlavi and the 
meteoric rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.  4
 Many leading members of the American academic community did not foresee 
revolution in Iran and reacted with considerable surprise to the events that spanned from  
 Iran Task Force, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, February 27, 1980. “Iran: 1
Confrontation With the United States.” CRS-1980-FND-0024. http://congressional.proquest.com:
80/congressional/docview/t21.d22.crs-1980-fnd-0024?accountid=11752. 2.  
 Osamah Khalil, America’s Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National 2
Security State. (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 
2016), 202-203. 
 Ibid., 229. 3
 Ibid., 203.4
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1978 to 1979. Mere weeks before the shah was exiled, political scientist and scholar of 
Middle Eastern studies George Lenczowski published a collection of essays titled Iran 
Under the Pahlavis, which included works from prominent scholars of MES such as 
Charles Issawi. In the book’s preface, Lenczowski praised the shah for bringing Iran out 
of “her semimedieval slumber to become one of Asia’s principal modernizing states.”  As 5
evidence, Lenczowski cited the political achievements of the shah: his White Revolution 
“represented a broad attack in every conceivable sector against the old ills of Iranian 
society,” and, despite setbacks, Pahlavi helped raise Iran out of its “weakness and 
backwardness to a higher level of strength.”  Lenczowski was not alone in his perception 6
that the shah was accomplishing positive work in Iran. After the revolution, Jahangir 
Amuzegar, a prominent Iranian economist and scholar, recalled in a 1991 book that a 
“salient feature” of the Islamic revolution was its “largely unexpected emergence.”  The 7
shock and rapidity of the shah’s fall and Khomeini’s rise were, for Amuzegar and other 
experts on the Middle East, defining features of the revolution. What caused the 
seemingly uncritical appraisals of the shah in the years before the Revolution? To what 
extent can we attribute American scholars’ prevalent support for the shah to the unique 
institutional context of MES during this period? 
 George Lenczowski, Iran Under the Pahlavis. ed. George Lenczowski (Stanford, California: 5
Hoover Institution Press, 1978), ix. 
 Lenczowski, Iran Under the Pahlavis, xxii. 6
 Jahangir Amuzegar, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis’ Triumph and 7
Tragedy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 10. 
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 Middle Eastern studies was distinguished from other area studies programs due to 
the abundance of oil in the Middle East, which simultaneously allowed the shah to 
establish a financial relationship with U.S. academics, and further allowed development 
theorists to argue that the Middle East could achieve economic modernity through proper 
allocation of petrodollars. Compared to other authoritarian leaders during the Cold War, 
the shah was well-positioned to leverage capital to influence American universities. The 
Iranian government’s oil revenues, which increased dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, 
endowed the shah with the financial resources to help support regional studies programs.  8
He established a circuit between the Iranian government and and American scholarship in 
which American universities and MES centers became relatively dependent on his 
financial largesse. Moreover, academics within oil-funded MES centers published 
scholarship which aligned with the authoritarian politics of the shah. This financial 
relationship was unique given that it was defined, both on the side of funding and on the 
side of scholarship, by the oil wealth associated with the region. 
 Although recent historians have observed the unique relationships between 
Middle Eastern studies, the U.S. federal government, and philanthropic foundations, their 
analyses do not fully explore the significance of oil and the relationship between the shah 
and American academia in this period. By focusing attention on the effects of petroleum 
on MES, we can better understand how and why the political dynamic of the field 
diverged from other area studies disciplines.  
 Hadi Salehi Esfahani and M. Hashem Pesaran, "The Iranian economy in the twentieth century: 8
A global perspective,” Iranian Studies 42, no. 2 (2009): 10. 
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 Zachary Lockman and Osamah Khalil, two contemporary historians of Middle 
Eastern studies, have recently released books exploring the unique dynamic of the field 
relative to other area studies disciplines. Khalil, in America’s Dream Palace, maintains 
that the national security state influenced the development of the regional studies 
discipline during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. He begins his analysis with wartime 
intelligence agencies such as the Office of the Coordinator of Information and the Office 
of Strategic Services, both of which supplied the U.S. government with expertise on the 
Middle East and fostered personal networks that bridged academia and the U.S. 
government.  He notes the elaborate interactions between “the U.S. government and 9
academic societies, universities, private foundations, and corporations” during this 
period.  Further, after the passage of the National Defense Education Act in 1958, both 10
Middle Eastern studies and area studies writ large flourished due to an influx of federal 
support, which President Eisenhower directed toward American universities with the 
specific intention of producing knowledge that would be relevant to America’s so-called 
ideological battle against Communism.  11
 The intellectual and ideological harmony between scholars of MES and architects 
of American foreign policy was another facet of the broader Cold War significance of 
MES. Khalil recognizes the link between the field of MES and modernization theory, 
arguing that many scholars largely supported the westernization and modernization of the 
 Osamah Khalil, America’s Dream Palace: Middle Eastern Expertise and the Rise of the 9
National Security State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 40-41. 
 Ibid., 77. 10
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Middle East. A guiding ideology for American foreign policy architects in the 1960s, 
modernization theory aimed at containing the threat of communism while simultaneously 
increasing the spread of American geopolitical influence overseas. Walt Whitman Rostow 
is credited with the theory’s first full elaboration in The Stages of Economic Growth: A 
Non-Communist Manifesto. His central work outlined a five-stage-process for linear 
economic growth of non-industrialized countries. According to Rostow’s theory, the 
economy of a society developed initially based on external demand from industrialized 
countries for raw materials, ultimately resulting in a ‘take off’ point after which economic 
growth becomes self-sustained. For Rostow, the goal of such social, political, and 
economic changes in underdeveloped countries was the condition of modernity.  12
 Khalil moreover demonstrates that the dominant social science paradigm of 
modernization theory in many ways relied on the scholarship of MES. In his analysis, 
which is centered around the ties between the U.S. foreign intelligence apparatus and 
MES, Khalil contends that proponents of modernization developed their theories based 
on research conducted on and in the Middle East. For example, David Lerner’s The 
Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, which was published in 
1958, provided a model for the ‘application’ of modernization theory in a regional 
context, and influenced a decade of theorists who wrote about the psychological effects 
of mass media and transportation on the so-called traditional societies in the Middle East. 
What is more, the “intellectual origins of modernization theory” were largely rooted in 
 W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (London: Cambridge 12
University Press, 1960), 4-12. 
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“research surveys conducted by Columbia University’s Bureau for Applied Social 
Research” and “Voice of America (VOA) in the Middle East.”  In brief, research on the 13
Middle East played an important role in the development of the theory. Although Khalil 
recognizes the connection between modernization theory and MES, he does not properly 
acknowledge the importance many development economists placed on oil itself for the 
modernization of the Middle East. For many of the scholars within centers of MES, 
development would have been impossible in the Middle East without the financial 
resources granted by oil and the authoritarian leadership offered by figures such as the 
shah. Thus, aside from helping centers of MES stay open during the 1970s, oil also 
undergirded the intellectual and ideological harmony between scholars, the U.S. 
government, and the shah. 
 Apart from the federal government, other traditional sources such as the Ford and 
Rockefeller Foundations bolstered Middle Eastern studies during the 1960s. In an effort 
to help promote the United States’ globalist ambitions during the Cold War, leaders of the 
Ford and Rockefeller Foundations helped build area studies programs that could provide 
expertise on foreign policy.  The Ford Foundation supported anticommunist efforts in 14
Indonesia, Nigeria, and Chile, and moreover contributed to the development of Asian, 
African, and Latin American studies centers.  The same holds true for Middle Eastern 15
studies. Osamah Khalil writes that beginning in the early 1950s, the Ford and Rockefeller 
 Khalil. America’s Dream Palace, 183.13
 Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller 14
Foundations in the Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
 Ibid. 15
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Foundations became major patrons of Middle Eastern studies, helping develop 
institutions such as Harvard’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies.  Zachary Lockman, 16
too, analyzes the role of the Ford and Rockefeller foundations in the development of 
Middle Eastern studies in America. He holds the Ford and Rockefeller foundations 
“helped accelerate the expansion of Middle Eastern studies” beginning in the 
mid-1950s.   While these works provide significant discussion of the role of foundations 17
in the development of Middle Eastern studies, they nevertheless do not address the fact 
that the major foundations supported MES centers to a lesser degree than to other area 
studies programs. As the foundations’ support for area studies waned in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, university administrators increasingly turned to private sources, rendering oil 
wealth more crucial to MES centers in the 1970s.  
 This is not to say that Khalil and Lockman ignore oil and the shah in their analysis 
of Middle Eastern studies. For example, Khalil’s discussion of oil wealth and MES is 
tangential to his central argument about the overlapping histories of Middle Eastern 
studies and the national security state.  Further, although Lockman discusses the role of 18
oil and the shah in MES centers, he presents this relationship as one of many sources of 
tension for MES centers during the 1970s, alongside intellectual disagreements and 
political polarization. Thus, although Lockman and Khalil address the role of oil and the 
 Osamah Khalil, America’s Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National 16
Security State (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2016), 167-169.
 Zachary Lockman, Field Notes: The Making of Middle East Studies in the United States 17
(Stanford University Press, 2016), Kindle Edition. Kindle Locations 3174-3178. 
 Khalil, America’s Dream Palace, 229-232. 18
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shah in MES, they orient their analysis in ways that do not fully address the significance 
of this relationship on the unique political dynamic of the field. The atmosphere of 
resource deprivation in MES centers, and the connections between American academics 
and the resource-rich Iranian government, rendered oil wealth significant to the regional 
studies field.  
 The role of oil and the shah on the development of Middle Eastern studies centers 
was not peripheral to a broader, more important story about the relationship between 
MES, the national security state, and private foundations. Rather, oil and the shah played 
a significant role in the development of the field, creating a unique political dynamic that 
further distinguished Middle Eastern studies from other area studies disciplines between 
1960 and 1979. The story of the shah’s involvement in American academia began in the 
mid-1950s, when he initiated connections with both the centers of Middle Eastern studies 
at the University of Chicago and Columbia University, as well as entire institutions of 
higher education, namely the University of Pennsylvania. During this period, scholars of 
Middle Eastern studies, such as William Polk at the University of Chicago and J.C. 
Hurewitz and Charles Issawi at Columbia University, sought to build a field centered 
around development and modernization, both of which were major policy goals of 
Pahlavi. Further, the relationship between the University of Pennsylvania and Pahlavi 
University - fostered by University of Pennsylvania administrators Max Copeland, 
Martin Meyerson, and Gaylord Harnwell - was part and parcel of modernization in Iran, 
aided by the U.S. government. As the federal government and private foundations began 
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to withdrawal from their role as the main financiers of knowledge production on the 
Middle East, private sources such as the shah and oil corporations became increasingly 
significant for maintaining the day-to-day operations of MES centers. Thus the history of 
MES in the 1960s and 1970s not only demonstrates the importance of oil for both the 
scholarship and funding of the field, but also can be read as an example of the early 
privatization of university funding that began during President Nixon’s administration.  
I 
 The histories of the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Chicago, and 
Columbia University demonstrate that American universities were associated with the 
modernizing governments of the Middle East. At the University of Chicago and 
Columbia University, the shah and scholars of Middle Eastern studies cultivated an 
informal relationship. American scholars of Middle Eastern studies sought to associate 
with the shah, and vice versa. Meanwhile, in 1962, the University of Pennsylvania signed 
a contract with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
Pahlavi University.  From 1962 to 1978, Pennsylvania helped develop the faculty and 19
resources at Pahlavi University to resemble more closely American universities, in 
exchange for annual grants from Pahlavi. In 1971, the administration at Pahlavi 
University signed a new contract with the University of Pennsylvania which bypassed 
USAID and allowed the two institutions to have a more direct relationship. During this 
period, a team of administrators and professors at Pennsylvania helped develop the 
 Gaylord P. Harnwell to Dr. William D. McElroy. February 20, 1970. UPA 4 Martin Meyerson 19
Papers. Box 296, folder 5. Inter-Institutional Cooperation Programs. Iran-Pahlavi University.  
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School of Medicine, the College of Agriculture, and the College of Arts and Sciences at 
Pahlavi University in Shiraz. 
 Although the Pahlavi-Pennsylvania partnership and MES encouraged 
development in Iran in different ways, the relationship between the shah and MES 
nevertheless overlapped with the history of the Pahlavi-Pennsylvania project. American 
academics at these three institutions were active agents in the economic development of 
Iran under Pahlavi’s rule beginning around 1958. At this time, the shah visited 
Pennsylvania, Chicago, and Columbia with the intention of stimulating growth in Iran by 
both encouraging MES programs to develop expertise on development and by helping the 
technical development of Iranian universities through international academic 
partnerships. Compared to other regional studies programs, MES was particularly open to 
influence from foreign governments given the financial constraints faced by MES 
centers, the extreme wealth of the shah, and his willingness to donate large sums to 
regional studies in America. In the early years oft the field, scholars of MES at Chicago 
and Columbia fleshed out a field distinct from Oriental studies, praised the shah’s so-
called White Revolution, and overlooked many of the elements of the Pahlavi regime that 
would eventually engulf Iran in revolution. They did so at a time when the federal 
government and private foundations still actively encouraged knowledge production 
through financial support. 
 The establishment of a coalition between Iranian officials and academics in 
America took place alongside fundamental transformations of American universities. 
!10
Since the end of the Second World War, an influx of federal funding into research 
catapulted universities into the national spotlight as important centers for research and 
development that aligned with the needs of the American Cold War policy.  At the same 20
time, large-scale philanthropic foundations such as the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie 
Foundations played an active role in the development of foreign policy and social 
sciences, cultivating an ethos of ‘Americanism’ both in the United States and abroad.  21
The emergence of MES occurred during these postwar shifts of American higher 
education and the university’s role in the domestic economy, as many programs in the 
United States enjoyed donations from philanthropic foundations as well as from the 
United States Department of Education.  A driving force behind these changes was the 22
intellectual mobilization of American resources against the global spread of communism. 
 Further, America universities and institutions in the Third World formed 
relationships in order to encourage modernization and development, and these 
relationships were another significant development of American higher education in the 
context of the Cold War.  For example, the University of Indonesia and the University of 
California at Berkeley formed a partnership in order to help train economists and 
influence economic development in Indonesia.  The primary purpose of this partnership 23
was to prevent the spread of communism in South Asia. Furthermore, the relationship 
 Margaret Pugh O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the Next 20
Silicon Valley (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), 58. 
 Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the Twentieth Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller 21
Foundations in the Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
 Osamah Khalil, America’s Dream Palace, 167-169.22
 Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian 23
Relations, 1960-1968. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008), 19. 
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between the Universidad Católica de Chile and the University of Chicago helped export 
market-centric economic thought from the Chicago School of Economics, aiding the 
U.S.-supported General Pinochet in his fight against the “alien ideas” of Marxism.  24
Chile was, like Indonesia, another crucial region for America’s perceived strategic 
interests: in 1973, the Central Intelligence Agency organized the overthrow of President 
Salvador Allende, a member of the Chilean Socialist party who threatened to undermine 
America’s geopolitical dominance in the Western hemisphere.  Thus, Chile became 25
another linchpin of the Cold War in which the American impulse for global ideological 
and political consensus manifested itself in violent conflict and a military dictatorship. In 
brief, the relationship between Pahlavi and Pennsylvania is part of a larger trend in which 
American institutions formed partnerships with universities in the Third World in order to 
encourage technological and economic development and to mitigate against the spread of 
communism in the developing world.  
 Compared to other countries in the Middle East, Iran was an especially significant 
strategic partnership for the United States during the Cold War period; the fundamental 
shift to a global oil economy put Middle Eastern petroleum at the center of Western 
modernity. During the First World War, the British Royal Navy switched to oil for its 
primary source of energy, and other navies followed.  By 1960, oil surpassed coal as the 26
 Juan Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge: 24
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 12. 
 Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists, 7. 25
 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (New York: Verso 26
Books, 2013), 63.
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key energy source as Americans become increasingly networked. Suburbanization, 
development of automobile technology, and improvements in the transportation 
infrastructure of the country moreover both allowed for and necessitated this 
transformation to a fuel economy.  The Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 further 27
marked the increasing global reliance on primarily Middle Eastern oil. In the agreement 
which established international financial and commercial relations, delegates effectively 
tied the value of the dollar to the flow of oil, given that oil, the basis of the postwar 
economy, was traded in U.S. dollars.  Oil thus powered postwar Western economic and 28
social modernity, placing the Middle East and Iran in a region of crucial geopolitical 
significance for the United States.  
 Both the strategic importance of oil, as well as the desire to combat the spread of 
communism, undergirded America’s close relationship with Iran. By the end of the 
Second World War, the United States had a “strategic foothold and access to Iranian oil,” 
whereas the Soviet Union sought and failed to obtain a similar relationship.  In 1953, 29
after the moderate socialist Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected to be the Prime Minister 
of Iran, the Central Intelligence Agency helped organize a coup that overthrew 
Mosaddegh and strengthened the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah, whose authoritarian 
rule would hinder the spread of communism in the underbelly of the Soviet Union.  30
 Robert Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the 27
Ciivl War (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
 Mitchell, Carbon Democracy, 111. 28
 Rashid Khalidi. Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East 29
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2009), 69. 
 Khalidi. Sowing Crisis, 21. 30
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After the coup, dubbed Operation Ajax, the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations 
deepened the relationship between Iran, sending economic aid to help develop the 
country. Indeed, the shah insisted that “he could not even think about joining a regional 
defense group” without a “multimillion-dollar U.S. military aid package.  Eventually, 31
Congress passed a bill which allowed Eisenhower “to use military force and $200 million 
in economic aid to support any nation in the Middle East,” including those in Iran, which 
constituted one of the best regional defenses against the Soviet Union.  Under Johnson’s 32
administration, Iran became one of the “two pillars” of security in the Persian Gulf 
region.  The U.S.-Iranian relationship manifested itself in academia as well, which, 33
much like the U.S. government of the Cold War, was similarly interested in the 
development of the Middle East.  
 At the same time the the shah established a relationship between American 
academia and the Iranian government, the United States government also sought to 
increase support for area studies, helping usher in a boom period for MES. In 1958, 
President Eisenhower signed the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), which placed 
higher education became a significant pillar for the national security state.  Title VI of 34
the NDEA called for funding for Language and Area Centers that could train students in 
languages “needed by the Federal Government or by business, industry, or education in 
 Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945. 31
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 3rd edition, 129. 
 Little, American Orientalism, 133. 32
 Little, American Orientalism, 140.33
 Zachary Lockman, Field Notes: The Making of Middle East Studies in the United States. 34
Location 1318 of 7949. 
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the United States,” and could furthermore instruct students on “fields such as history, 
political science, linguistics, economics, sociology, geography, and anthropology.” The 
bill was directly relevant to Eisenhower’s Cold War interests, given that the NDEA 
required recipients of federal funding to sign an affidavit affirming that “he does not 
believe in, and is not a member of and does not support any organization that believes in 
or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence or by any 
illegal or unconstitutional methods.”   35
 Further, members of the U.S. foreign intelligence branches helped create the field 
of Middle Eastern studies during the postwar period, as prominent scholars of MES at 
Columbia University and the University of Chicago established programs which would 
align their policies with United States foreign policy interests. William Polk from the 
University of Chicago, and J.C. Hurewitz from Columbia University were two such 
academics, embedded in both the U.S. foreign policy branch and midcentury academia. 
Before entering the university, Hurewitz worked in the Office of the Coordinator of 
Information, a wartime agency responsible for providing American foreign policy 
architects with expertise.  After working in U.S. foreign intelligence, Hurewitz moved to 36
Columbia to open the Middle East Institute (MEI) in 1954. Polk, meanwhile, lectured in 
Arabic studies at Harvard during the 1950s, and subsequently worked in the Policy 
 The full text of the National Defense Education Act is at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/35
STATUTE-72/pdf/STATUTE-72-Pg1580.pdf
 Khalil, America’s Dream Palace, 43. 36
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Planning Council at President Kennedy’s State Department.  Almost ten years after 37
Hurewitz had opened his department in Columbia, Polk left the State Department to open 
the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES) in 1964. Finally, Max Copeland, who 
oversaw the exchange between Pahlavi and Pennsylvania, was the first American to be 
arrested during the Iranian revolution. Copeland was charged with acting as an agent for 
the Central Intelligence Agency during the 1970s. Although it is unclear whether the 
allegations against him are accurate, his son wrote an investigative memoir in which he 
concluded that the accusations were likely true.  In short, the extent to which Hurewitz, 38
Polk, and Copeland freely moved between the government and the university indicates 
the overlap between the two spheres during the Cold War.  
 J.C. Hurewitz placed development at the center of the MEI’s agenda. In order to 
correct the perceived deficiencies of Oriental studies at Columbia, Hurewitz recruited 
prominent social scientists from Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran to the MEI. Among the 
scholars included included the Western-educated development economist Ömer Celac 
Sarç, political scientist Serif Mardin, and economist and economic historian Charles 
Issawi.  Hurewitz, in 1964, wrote that his program “resembles a development program. 39
In fact, it might amply be dubbed an American development program for our own 
 Nathan J. Citno, “The ‘crush’ of ideologies: the United States, the Arab world, and Cold War 37
modernization,” Cold War History 12, no. 1 (2012): 92. 
 Cyrus Copeland, Off the Radar: A Father’s Secret, A Mother’s Heroism, and a Son’s Quest 38
(New York: Blue Rider Press, 2015), 315. 
 J.C. Hurewitz, “The Education of J.C. Hurewitz,” in Paths to the Middle East: Ten Scholars 39
Look Back, ed. Thomas Naff (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993): 81-83. 
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underdeveloped studies of the underdeveloped areas of the world.”  Further, in a 40
retrospective memoir chapter written in 1993, Hurewitz explained how modernization 
and development was a central component of the MEI, and that Hurewitz and Issawi “put 
the hybrid discipline to work on Middle East oil” beginning in the later half of the 
1950s.  In brief, Hurewitz, like Polk, insisted that development was an academic priority 41
of his program.  
 Ten years later, Polk opened the CMES in Chicago and similarly placed 
development and modernization at the center of the CMES’s agenda. In 1966, Polk 
organized a conference on the “beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East in the 
19th Century” in which central scholars studying foreign intervention, modernization, 
education, and social development could meet in order to elaborate how they believed the 
processes of modernization should look when ‘applied’ to nation-states. Among those 
present were development scholars such as Ottoman historian Stanford Shaw and 
economic historian Charles Issawi. At the conference, key figures in the field presented 
papers on the erosion of traditional economic systems, increasing urbanization in the 
region, trade routes, and education.  Although the conference focused exclusively on the 42
nineteenth century, Polk believed that these issues were useful in a contemporary context 
 J.C. Hurewitz. ‘Undergraduate Foreign Area Studies: The Case of the Middle East—Report on 40
a Conference,’ American Council of Learned Societies Newsletter 15, no. 4 (April 1965), p. 4. 
Cited in Martin Kramer, Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America 
(Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), 13.
 Hurewitz, “The Education of J.C. Hurewitz,” 84.41
 Polk. ‘Conference on the Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East’, University of 42
Chicago. Office of the President. Levi Administration. Records, [Box 79, Folder 9], Special 
Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.
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given that they provided “a simpler model of 20th century complexities,” and that the 
meeting was an opportunity for prominent scholars in the field to define the process of 
modernization. The papers of the conference were published in a book titled The 
Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, and were well-received within the field 
of MES. Norman Itzkowitz, a prominent historian in the field, and Michael Hudson, a 
political scientist, both reviewed the papers from the conference favorably, writing that 
the collection of papers on modernization “is an auspicious beginning for the new series 
from the University of Chicago's Center for Middle Eastern Studies.”  43
 The shah similarly had modernization in mind when he visited American 
universities, seeking to create a network between American universities and higher 
education in Iran. One year after the creation of the Middle East Institute at Columbia 
University in 1954, and two years after the execution of Operation Ajax, the president of 
Columbia invited the shah to New York to receive an honorary law degree. During his 
visit, the shah spoke at a lecture sponsored by the School of International Studies, 
praising the Institute and announcing his funding of a smaller-scale Iranian studies 
institute within the MEI that would receive gifts from Tehran. He claimed that the United 
States was in “a position to pay some of its debt to the East in technology and industrial 
skill, and in the political doctrines and application of democracy.”  One way the United 44
States can do this, according to the shah, was through educating Iranians. Iranian students 
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in America, according to the shah, “have, in no small measure, played a part in the social 
and national awareness and modernization of Iran.”  By funding the Iranian Studies 45
center within the MEI, the shah hoped that Iranians would be able to “find the light on the 
threshold of Columbia.”  The shah further countered the so-called “brain drain” by 46
sponsoring an “American-style University in Iran” that could help keep educated Iranians 
within national borders. Thus, in order to help Iran more closely resemble Western 
powers, the shah sought both to develop Iranian universities and the study of Iran at 
American universities. 
 In 1958, the Pahlavi regime asked educators at the University of Pennsylvania “to 
survey several Iranian Universities and determine which institutions might be most 
appropriately transferred into an American-style university.”  This, Pahlavi believed, 47
would help educators select an institution to develop according to the Western model. 
Their study, titled “A Pattern for a New University in Iran,” identified the University of 
Shiraz given the previous existence of a medical school on the campus. After another two 
years the Iranian Majlis transformed the University of Shiraz into Pahlavi University, 
establishing “a free and independent institution financed by the Iranian government and 
student tuition fees.”  The United States Agency for International Development 48
moreover signed a contract between Pahlavi and Pennsylvania for 1962-1967, in which 
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Pahlavi University sent money to the University of Pennsylvania in return for the 
Pennsylvania-sponsored “growth and development at Pahlavi.”  Under the initial 49
contract, a team at Pennsylvania helped hire faculty members for Pahlavi, playing a 
highly influential role in the development of departments such as the “archeology, 
anthropology, fine arts and the history of art, literature,” as well as the medical school, 
the veterinary school, the agricultural school, and the field of engineering.  In short, the 50
shah sought to utilize American academic resources in order to combat the brain drain, 
help establish an American-style university in Iran, and ultimately help Iran more closely 
resemble its Western models. The Pennsylvania-Pahlavi contract was a major step 
forward in this effort.  
 The relationship between the Pahlavi regime and American academics, forged 
between 1955 and 1965 with the intent of encouraging Iranian modernization, emerged in 
three significant ways. First, and most directly, donations flowed from Tehran to 
Columbia and Chicago, helping maintain Middle Eastern studies during a period of 
financial limitations. Scholars of MES would have been particularly interested in a 
wealthy benefactor such as the shah given the financial constraints of MES centers. 
Second, university administrators in Pennsylvania helped develop professional schools in 
Shiraz, exporting American scientific and technical mastery to Iran in order to encourage 
university development. Third, American scholars of MES published works that either 
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encouraged the modernization of Iran using oil wealth or, in extreme instances, outwardly 
praised Pahlavi for his efforts to bring Western-style modernity to Iran. In other words, 
scholars of MES encouraged modernization in Iran, with very few critiques of the major 
development paradigm emerging within the network of American MES and Iranian 
officials.  
 The connection between the shah and MES programs tangibly manifested itself in 
the form of hard cash from the Pahlavi regime. Although some of the donations from Iran 
seem relatively small, they were nevertheless meaningful given the financial constraints 
of centers for Middle Eastern studies. The participation of oil-rich governments in the 
funding apparatus of MES programs differentiate the field from other regional studies 
centers during this period.   
 Both the shah’s high oil revenue, and his willingness to share some of that 
revenue with universities in America, justified the administrators’ belief that Iran could or 
would donate money for Iranian studies in America. Indeed, since 1960, oil production in 
Iran had blossomed, giving the government the revenue it needed to initiate the reforms 
of the White Revolution. As the Iranian government increased oil prices fourfold in the 
1970s, Iran became even more dependent on oil for domestic spending.  Thus, 51
government revenue due to the increasing importance of the oil commodity put the shah 
in a strategic position to act as a benefactor for regional studies in America.  
 April R. Summitt, "For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran,” Middle 51
East Journal 58, no. 4 (2004): 572, accessed March 25th, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4330063.
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 Further, the shah had a history of sharing oil wealth with American universities. In 
1967 he committed $3 million to build a proposed Shahanshah Aria Mehr Center for 
Iranian and Middle Eastern Studies on the University of Chicago’s campus.  Abdolmajid 52
Majidi, the Iranian Deputy Prime Minister and Director of the Central Budget Bureau at 
the Iranian Plan Organization, wrote to Polk in the same year, claiming that “such 
undertaking will augment the fulfillment of closer understanding of each other’s cultural 
heritage and will further expand the friendship of our two Nations.”  In other words, 53
Majidi saw the Pahlavi building as a small-scale manifestation of the goodwill between 
the governments of Iran and the United States. Moreover, the new Pahlavi-funded 
building in Chicago reflected an academic turn toward development and modernization in 
Middle Eastern studies. After receiving funding from the shah, Polk discussed an 
announcement dinner to which he would invite leading MES scholars, U.S. government 
officials, ambassadors from Iran, and the “leaders of major American corporations 
interested in the economic development of the Middle East…”  Perceiving economic 54
development to be one of the fundamental academic purposes of the CMES, Polk planned 
to invite those invested in the development of the Middle East to the Pahlavi center. 
Finally, Polk recognized the link between the shah’s gifts to American MES and his 
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program to develop education in Iran. In 1968, he wrote that the “shah’s great efforts in 
education at home have now been supplemented by his concern for helping to advance 
knowledge here.”  The building would, in short, help tighten the relationship between 55
the United States and Iran, give a physical space to the development-oriented CMES, and 
would complement the development of higher education in Iran.  
 Polk’s ambitious efforts to construct a Pahlavi building in Chicago eventually 
failed. The Iranian government officially rescinded its donation in 1971, after 
administrators at Chicago requested more funds. Jahangir Amuzegar of the Iranian 
Economic Mission explained that “the University has recently asked the Iranian 
Government for additional funds over the $3 million original donation” in order to “use 
the whole amount for purposes other than the original objectives.”  For these reasons, 56
the government chose to withdraw the financial support to the University of Chicago.  
 Despite the failure of Polk to obtain funds from Iran, the shah nevertheless funded 
other regional studies programs in the U.S. According to Osamah Khalil, he made 
contributions to fifty-five higher educational institutions, and some members of his 
administration and family served on university boards.  At Columbia, he periodically 57
sent between $5,000 and $8,000 to the Center for Iranian Studies, which shared an 
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administrative staff with the MEI.  Although this was a small sum compared to 58
donations from large-scale philanthropic institutions, these gifts became much more 
significant as federal and philanthropic support receded during the 1970s. Finally, part of 
the Pahlavi-Pennsylvania-USAID contract dictated that Pahlavi University, which had 
been converted by Iranian Majdis to a state-funded university following the 
recommendation of developers in Pennsylvania, send money to the University of 
Pennsylvania in response for assistance with the development of Pahlavi University.  59
This partnership was thus a formal version of the relationship between Pahlavi and MES: 
funding flowed from Tehran to America in exchange for assistance with national 
development.  
 A second manifestation of the U.S.-Iranian academic relationship was the extent 
to which professors and students traveled from Iran to America, and from America to 
Iran. After 1950, Iranian students in the United States proliferated; this process was aided 
by the shah’s relationship with schools such as the University of Chicago, Columbia 
University, and the University of Pennsylvania. During this period, many Iranians left the 
Middle East for American universities “and returned to contribute to the shah’s program 
of rapid socioeconomic modernization,” given that a large number of American-educated 
Iranians “were elected to the majlis, entered the shah’s bureaucracy, staffed the Plan 
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Organization and the National Iranian Oil Company, [or] worked in the financial 
sector…”  In other words, American-educated Iranians proved to be valuable assets for 60
the shah, who escalated his project of economic development in 1964. Moreover J.C. 
Hurewitz estimated that one fourth of the students at the Middle East Institute “come 
from the Middle East itself,” including a large proportion from Iran.  In a 1975 article, 61
Edward Fiske, an education writer, noted the related increase in Iranian students at 
American universities as well as a “five-year joint educational program” between 
Georgetown University and Ferdowsi University in Iran, one of many academic 
partnerships that accompanied the increase in the number of students in this country.  62
The number of students enrolled in MES programs increased in part due to the efforts of 
the Iranian government.  
 As students increasingly utilized American academic resources, administrators 
and developers in America similarly sent American-educated scholars to Shiraz in order 
to encourage the technical development of Pahlavi University. In 1970, Gaylord Harnwell 
at the University of Pennsylvania cited the accomplishments of the Pahlavi-Pennsylvania 
project since its initiation in 1962. He praised the Pennsylvania team for sending to 
Shiraz the applications of “approximately 310 Iranians in the fields of engineering (83), 
medicine (58), agriculture (50), and arts and sciences (119),” making up about “18% of 
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the total Iranian graduate student population in the United States.” Regarding the other 
purpose of the Pahlavi-Pennsylvania contract, to hire American-educated professors 
directly for Pahlavi, the Pennsylvania team made significant headway as well, sending 
“the applications of 84 persons, primarily Americans, who were interested in direct-hire 
appointments.”  The Pahlavi-Pennsylvania project, in short, made significant advances 63
in its overarching goal of exporting American-based expertise to Shiraz.  
 Alongside the medical and technical programs, university developers in 
Philadelphia also sought to export social sciences to Shiraz. The Pennsylvania team, 
which included Max Copeland and Arthur H. Doerr, wanted to build a program in 
economics that instructed students based on Keynesian methods. After unsuccessful 
interviews with various candidates, Copeland and the Pennsylvania team eventually 
turned to Taghi Kermani, an associate professor of development economics at 
Youngstown University. In November of 1965, Deihl, who required that professors taught 
‘New Economics’ to students in Shiraz, requested that Copeland contact Kermani 
specifically regarding the open faculty position.  After meeting with other members of the 
Pennsylvania team, Charles Babcock, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, 
concluded that he was “much impressed by [Kermani’s] personal qualities, and I am 
convinced of his interest in coming to Shiraz.”  In 1959, Kermani finished his 64
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dissertation, titled The United States Participation in the Economic Development in the 
Middle East, associating him with the kind of United States-aided development intended 
by the Pahlavi-Pennsylvania contract. Lincoln Deihl requested that Taghi Kermani reach 
out to Copeland for a position and, one year later, Kermani became the head of the 
Economics Department in Shiraz.   65
 The selection of Kermani over other potential candidates illustrates that Copeland 
and Deihl not only sought to develop the Department of Economics in Shiraz, but 
intended to recruit American economists of a particular ideological sensibility. Kermani 
conformed to the ‘New Economics,’ specializing in development in the Middle East. 
Moreover, his subsequent publication record reflects the Pennsylvania-Pahlavi 
commitment to modernization in the region. One year after Kermani was recruited to 
Pahlavi, in 1967, he published a book titled Economic Development in Action: Theories, 
Problems, and Procedures as Applied in the Middle East. In his preface, Kermani 
identified the distance between theories of  economic development and the 
socioeconomic realities of the Middle East. He insisted that his book “seeks to bring most 
existing theories of economic development into contact with reality as it exists in the 
Middle East” and moreover “[introduce] the role of foreign assistance in the process of 
economic development in the area.”  In a section in which Kermani discussed major 66
theories of economic development, including the Keynesian model and the theories of 
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Albert Hirschmann, Ragnar Nurkse, and W.W. Rostow, he concluded that “among most 
historical theories of growth, Rostow’s stage theory is probably the most likely to apply 
in the Middle East.”  He wrote that countries in the Middle East had been experiencing 67
social and economic growth due to contact with the West, and that this growth had set the 
“preconditions for take off” elaborated by Rostow, causing revolution in some instances 
and reform in others. Finally, Kermani compared the White Revolution favorably to other 
social revolutions in the Middle East, claiming that the shah’s style of “evolutionary 
reform” was “more likely to meet success in the Middle East than revolution,” given that 
evolution was “usually accompanied by some degree of the political and economic 
stability desperately needed.”  Invoking the need for stability, Kermani integrated an 68
important buzzword in the justification of U.S.-supported leaders in the Middle East.  
 University administrators at the University of Pennsylvania made important 
strides in helping build departments at Pahlavi University, including the Department of 
Economics. Moreover, the appointment of Kermani over other potential candidates can 
be read as an important yet subtle example of the way in which the international context 
of American universities influenced the field of MES. Indeed, Kermani’s intellectual 
profile mapped well onto the politics of the shah. Furthermore, Kermani’s conclusions 
regarding the “proper” way to develop Iran were not uncommon during this period. Many 
other academics, including Charles Issawi, George Lenczowski, and Jahangir Amuzegar, 
reflected the sensibilities of Kermani. A final manifestation of the relationship between 
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Pahlavi’s administration and American academics was the scholarship of MES itself, 
which remained largely uncritical of the Pahlavi regime. By emphasizing the value of oil 
reserves, which could bring about economic and social modernity in Iran,  and by 
praising the ‘political stability’ offered by the authoritarian structure of the shah’s regime, 
development theorists and economists aligned their publications with the shah’s policy 
goal of economic modernization. At both the CMES and the MEI, scholars published 
literature which would advocate the authoritarian modernization of Iran using oil wealth.  
 Many scholars of Middle Eastern studies during this period were optimistic about 
the prospect for oil to generate social and economic modernity in oil-centered economies. 
Charles Issawi, the leading economic historian of the Middle East at Columbia 
University, was one scholar according to whom oil provided an opportunity for countries 
in the Middle East to develop according to a Western model. As early as 1952, Issawi 
referred to petroleum as “the greatest single asset of the Middle East.”  For Issawi oil 69
could help Middle Eastern countries break out of the “vicious cycles” that affected the 
developing countries of the Third Word. Scholars at the CMES similarly insisted that oil 
wealth could help modernize Iran given the right conditions. In 1969, Polk wrote that the 
unique challenges and possibilities for economic development manifested themselves in 
the Middle East as oil wealth provided new possibilities for structuring Middle Eastern 
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economic development.  “Oil,” he wrote in The United States and the Arab World, was 70
“the great exception to generalizations about the Middle East.”  In his monograph, he 71
argued that oil endowed the Middle East with endless economic resources in the form of 
petroleum. In the context of America’s new fuel economy, which placed oil at the center 
of economic growth, Polk believed that oil reserves had the possibility to transform 
countries such as Kuwait into a “golden land.”  72
 However, some scholars of MES believed that oil alone was insufficient for 
helping bring economic modernity to Iran. Issawi, for example, associated Iran’s 
economic success with the strong central governance provided by the shah. In 1967, he 
wrote that the “economic and social progress made by Iran stands plain to see and, given 
political stability, there is every reason to hope that it can continue, and accelerate, during 
the next few years.”  Issawi repeated this sentiment two years later, claiming that if 73
internal stability can be achieved in the Middle East, there were “good grounds for 
optimism” that the region could see positive economic outcomes.  In short, many 74
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development scholars of MES believed that both oil wealth and the autocratic governing 
structure of the Pahlavi regime would encourage economic growth in Iran.  
 The causal relationship between the shah’s support for MES and development aid 
from members of the American academic community is nuanced and heterogeneous. At 
the University of Chicago, academics had few formal commitments to the shah, after the 
Iranian government withdrew its funding of the Pahlavi building. Given that Polk 
actively sought support from the shah by traveling to Iran, presenting his work on 
economic growth in the Middle East to the shah, and characterizing the CMES as largely 
a development center, it is unlikely that Polk was coaxed into supporting the shah with 
financial donations from Tehran. Rather, Polk’s views aligned with the shah, and the two 
figures sought a mutually beneficial partnership. However, at the University of 
Pennsylvania, where the Iranian-American academic alliance was strongest, the pressure 
to select modernization theorists for professorships was greater. The relationship between 
institutional dynamics on one hand and scholarship privileging authoritarian 
modernization on the other hand was more direct in the context of the Pahlavi-
Pennsylvania partnership.  
II 
 Changes in both state support for academia and the priorities of philanthropic 
foundations in the late 1960s and early 1970s created financial pressures for area studies 
writ large, and Middle Eastern studies in particular. MES programs, which faced the 
threat of closure throughout the 1970s, continued to rely on the shah for financial support. 
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Moreover, after the oil crisis of 1973, administrators in MES centers further relied on 
donations from oil companies in order to remain open. Although some scholars within the 
institutions of MES were critical of both the shah and his relationship with American 
academia, these voices remained marginal during the 1970s. By analyzing MES in the 
1970s, one can observe not only the decreased role of traditional managers of academic 
production in the social sciences, but also the continued significance of oil and the shah 
for MES centers. Thus, the history of MES in the 1970s should be read as an example of 
early privatization of academic research.  
 An atmosphere of resource deprivation in MES centers began in the late 1960s 
and lasted throughout the 1970s, as traditional philanthropic foundations, such as the 
Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, reduced their donations to area studies programs. The 
withdrawal of Ford Foundation support occurred in large part due to the leadership of 
McGeorge Bundy, who set a new agenda for the foundation during his time as president. 
Bundy, who worked as the National Security Advisor for President Kennedy and 
President Johnson, became the president of the Foundation in 1966. Under Bundy’s 
presidency, the Ford Foundation sought to shift financial support away from area studies 
programs and toward development projects abroad.  Thus, as Lockman notes, by the late 75
1960s the Ford Foundation demonstrated, through reduced funding, that “the ‘bonanza 
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years’ had come to an end and that a new era of more limited resources and slower 
growth, no growth at all or even retrenchment had begun for area studies.”  76
 At Columbia University, the decrease in donations from philanthropic foundations 
such as the Ford Foundation disproportionately affected the Middle East Institute relative 
to other area studies programs. In 1973, the administrative committee of the Middle East 
Institute noted that “the foundations were no longer interested in general funding and 
would restrict their grants to special projects…”  In 1973, a three-year long grant to the 77
MEI from the Ford Foundation expired, contributing to the depletion of the MEI’s 
financial resources.  The same year that the grant for MES terminated, the Foundation 78
redirected financial resources to the Institute on East Central Asia, contributing a total of 
$150,000 to the program.  Finally, the East Asian Studies center at Columbia received a 79
$600,000 contribution from the Ford Foundation in the mid-1970s.  In brief, the ebb of 80
donations from the Ford Foundation affected the MEI more than it did other centers of 
graduate study, which continued to enjoy large sums of money from wealthy foundations.  
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 The withdrawal of federal support for academia in general, and Middle Eastern 
studies in particular, further contributed to the privatization of funding for MES centers in 
the 1970s. The economist and historian of science Philip Mirowksi argues that U.S. 
federal support for academic research began to fall in 1967, reversing the previous notion 
that the state should fund academic research.  There are several explanations for the 81
decrease in support from the U.S. government for area studies centers during this period. 
First, recessions in 1969-1970 and 1973-1975 restricted the federal budget. Second, 
student protests against the Vietnam war and the rise of the New Left in American 
academia created a felt distance between the federal government from universities. For 
example, protests at Columbia propelled the university into the national spotlight in 1968 
and lasted for several years afterward.  In 1972, a group of professors from the School of 82
International Affairs, including Hurewitz, wrote to President McGill claiming that the 
student protesters threatened the physical safety of the faculty.  In this political 83
atmosphere, conservative politicians were inclined to reduce funding for higher 
education, and in 1971 the Nixon administration reduced Title VI funding from $12.85 
million to $7.17 million.  To Mirowski, this reduction in federal support was part of a 84
broader movement in which the government distanced itself from the responsibility of 
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educating its citizens, instead “[seeking] to reengineer democracy by privatizing” the 
education of citizens, and by turning universities into service industries.  In short, the 85
Nixon administration engendered new period in which the state played a smaller role in 
the supply of education and production of knowledge. 
 To an extent, the financial problems that the political developments posed were 
not exclusive to Middle Eastern studies but instead affected area studies writ large. When 
Congress failed to maintain a high level of funding for area studies programs in 1968, 
Andrew Cordier, the Dean at the Columbia University, insisted that it is “in the national 
interest to keep our international programs on American campuses from shrinking or 
dying from lack of funds.”  He moreover lamented that “the amount of money to be 86
appropriated [for area studies centers in America] is small.”  He and President Grayson 87
Kirk of Columbia University circulated a letter to sixty-four university presidents urging 
congress to “extend the authority under which this program is supported and to augment 
federal contribution to its financing.”  The letter warned that the “most serious problem 88
in this program is inadequate financing,” given that “the costs of Language and Area 
Studies have risen faster than the average increase in the expense of higher education.”  89
University presidents including George Beadle and Grayson Kirk submitted this letter to 
 Philip Mirowski. Science-Mart (Kindle Locations 311-313). Kindle Edition. 85
 Memorandum. Andrew Cordier to George Beadle, January 29, 1969. University of Chicago. 86
Office of the President. Levi Administration. Records, [Box 253, Folder 8], Special Collections 
Research Center, University of Chicago Library. 
 Ibid.87
 Ibid. 88
 Ibid.89
!35
members of Congress and President Johnson. In short, several university presidents 
believed that the the retrenchment of federal support would broadly affect area studies.  
 The U.S. government’s relative neglect of Middle Eastern studies compared to 
other area studies programs further exacerbated the receding federal support for 
universities writ large. In 1970, the federal government awarded merely 14 Graduate 
Fellowships to students at the Middle East Institute at Columbia, compared with 18 at the 
Latin American Institute, 26 at the Russian and East Central Europe Institutes, and 51 at 
the East Asian Institute.  The MES centers at the University of Washington and the 90
University of Chicago similar had relatively weak federal support compared to centers for 
Russian studies and East Asian studies.  In 1969, Middle Eastern studies centers in 91
America received merely $672,550 in federal support, compared to $851,630 for Latin 
American studies, $1,217,203 for Russian and Eastern European studies, and $2,497,418 
for South and Far East Asian studies.  Like the foundations, the federal government 92
similarly supported centers for MES to a lesser extent than it supported other regional 
studies programs.  
 As Osamah Khalil notes, it remains a historical paradox that the state would 
withdrawal funding for Middle Eastern studies centers despite the increasing Cold War 
significance of the Middle East during the 1970s.  Two possibilities can help explain this 93
phenomenon. First, despite the geopolitical importance of the Middle East, the United 
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States was embroiled in ‘hot’ conflicts that rendered knowledge production in regions 
other than the Middle East more immediately relevant. Specifically, the Vietnam conflict 
escalated in the late 1960s, creating a political climate that might privilege South Asian 
studies over MES. The international rivalry between the United States and the Soviet 
Union moreover increased the importance of Russian studies programs relative to other 
regional disciplines. Thus, although the Middle East remained a significant region in 
terms of U.S. foreign policy, knowledge production on Latin America, the Soviet Union, 
and Vietnam might have taken precedence. Second, scholars began to produce knowledge 
on the Middle East outside of the institutions of MES, contributing to the diminishing 
importance of academia to the national security state. Think tanks such as the Brookings 
Institution, for example, began to study the Middle East in the 1970s, emphasizing the 
role of the United States in maintaining regional peace and stability.  94
 The decisions of the Ford Foundation and the federal government to reduce 
support for Middle Eastern studies created an atmosphere of resource privation in the 
MES centers at both Chicago and Columbia. During this period, administrators of both 
the MEI and the CMES believed that their institutions’ existence was contingent on the 
small amounts of support they received from private sources. Professor John Woods at 
the University of Chicago stated that a main tension for the CMES during the 1970s was 
its financial struggle, which presented an existential threat to the Center.  Charles Issawi 95
 Khalil, America’s Dream Palace, 222-223. 94
 John Woods (Professor at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies), interview by William Krause 95
at the University of Chicago on May 25th, 2016. 
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emphasized this deprivation at Columbia in 1973 when he wrote in a letter to the 
administrative committee of the MEI that “the main objective of the Middle East Institute 
for the next few years can be stated simply: survival.”  Hurewitz similarly commented 96
on the privation of the MEI.  He wrote that the center “suffered severe budgetary 
constriction because of the continued slackening of federal and foundational support for 
international programs and the readily mounting costs of operation and tuition.”  An 97
annual report for the academic year 1974-1975 wrote that “the Center is on the verge of 
becoming moribund” and that “the Columbia Center has been reduced to an uncertain 
and possibly nonviable program.”  Two years later, Hurewitz explained that “the large 98
foundations and the federal government” have withdrawn the “support that enabled the 
Institute to keep abreast of developments.”  99
 As a result of the withdrawal of support from traditional sources such as the Ford 
Foundation and the federal government, administrators and academics continued to orient 
themselves toward the shah and other private financial sources, pursuing relationships 
with Iran until the eve of the revolution. At Chicago, the lingering memory of the shah’s 
large-scale donation had an affect on administrators of the CMES. Despite the failure of 
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the Pahlavi Building, administrators in Chicago held onto the promise of an additional 
donation from the shah during the 1970s. Edward Levi wrote in a 1974 letter that 
although the shah withdrew his financial support, there was nevertheless “some 
suggestion that at a later time the government of Iran might consider a gift to the 
University for Iranian studies.”   100
 Administrators at Columbia similarly turned toward the shah for financial 
assistance. In 1973, Issawi expressed his belief that “with the vast increase in the 
revenues of the oil producing countries of the Middle East, some additional funds [to the 
Institute] may be forthcoming in the future.”  Scholars in the MEI, according to Issawi, 101
continued trying “to obtain funds from two Middle Eastern governments, those of Kuwait 
and Iran,” applying for a $1.6 million grant from the Pahlavi Foundation.  Although this 102
proposal “stalled” upon arrival in Tehran, and was ultimately ignored, administrators at 
Columbia perceived the Pahlavi regime as a wealthy and potentially helpful resource. 
Other universities similarly enjoyed donations from the Iranian government; Princeton, 
for example, received a $400,000 donation to create a Pahlavi Endowment for Iranian 
Studies.  These universities, however, were merely several of fifty-five other higher 103
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educational institutions to which the shah donated.  Given that MES was not a priority 104
in the eyes of traditional donors such as the U.S. government and the Ford and 
Rockefeller Foundations, scholars of MES oriented themselves toward the shah as a 
nontraditional financial resource.  
 Columbia University maintained a relationship with Iran up until the eve of the 
revolution, and the MEI kept economic development as a primary academic goal. In 
1977, Columbia gave the Shahbanou of Iran Farah Pahlavi the Preisdential Citation of 
Distinction. In President William McGill’s letter inviting Pahlavi to Columbia, he 
described the University as “the cradle of Iranian studies in the United States and…an 
institution which has maintained continuous and fruitful ties with your country…”  105
Further, McGill lauded Pahlavi’s “vigorous support of artistic endeavors in Iran” and her 
“dedication to the cause of humane values in the midst of overriding technological and 
economic exigencies.” He closed the letter explaining how both Farah Pahlavi and 
Muhammad Reza Shah’s “tremendous effort for progress and self-sufficiency” had “been 
a constant source of inspiration for public service.”  McGill thus praised Pahlavi’s 106
efforts to render Western-style political modernity in Iran. Although one Columbia 
graduate called to protest the event, the general silence among members of the MEI hints 
at the underlying ideological consensus among most within the field.  
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 Administrators at the University of Pennsylvania similarly continued their 
relationship with Pahlavi University until 1979. In the early 1970s, state officials, 
members of other Iranian institutions, and academics involved in the Pahlavi-
Pennsylvania project expressed satisfaction with the partnership between the two 
universities. Administrators from other Iranian universities looked with envy at the 
arrangement between Pahlavi and Pennsylvania. Harnwell wrote that, between 1962 and 
1970, “we have been approached by three Iranian institutions making inquiry as to 
whether we would be willing to conclude contractual arrangements to provide a variety 
of services.”  For example, Jundi Shaper University and Pars College both contacted 107
Max Copeland to inquire whether a similar setup could be arranged.  Harnwell and 108
Copeland eventually turned such offers down, knowing that administrators in Shiraz 
wished the Pennsylvania team devote its resources to Pahlavi University. When Copeland 
spoke with the shah at a Department of State luncheon, Pahlavi expressed “very nice 
words” for “our program in Shiraz.”  Harnwell agreed with the shah, claiming that “our 109
affiliation with Pahlavi University has been beneficial for both institutions…”  Finally, 110
the administration at the University of Pennsylvania expressed satisfaction with their 
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work in helping modernize education in Iran. Meanwhile, in 1969, Assadollah Alam - the 
former Prime Minister of Iran who subsequently served as the president of Pahlavi 
University - invited Harnwell to Shiraz to receive an honorary degree from Pahlavi 
University.  In 1970, Harnwell circulated a congratulatory newspaper article in the 111
Philadelphia Inquirer that praised the shah’s so-called White Revolution. The author 
wrote that the shah’s reform was “one of the great success stories of the decade,” given 
that it had “done wonders for the economy.”  That Harnwell thought to send an article 112
praising the shah’s modernizing reforms to the Pennsylvania team suggests that he 
believed their work fit into the shah’s overarching ‘revolutionary’ development policies.  
 Further, Gaylord Harnwell and Martin Meyerson - the new president of the 
University of Pennsylvania - worked to maintain the arrangement. In July, 1971, 
Meyerson renewed the contract for a period of five years beginning in 1972.  The 113
central components of the new contract included “the strengthening of undergraduate 
programs in the College of Arts and Sciences, the setting up of further advanced courses 
in the Medical School, and the inauguration of a doctoral program in the Engineering 
School.”  Two years later, Meyerson made plans to travel to Iran, communicating that 114
 Assodolah Alam to Gaylord Harnwell. November 12, 1969. UPA 4 Martin Meyerson Papers. 111
Box 296, folder 5. Inter-Institutional Cooperation Programs, Iran-Pahlavi University. University 
of Pennsylvania Special Collections. 
 Edwin Leane. “Shah of Iran Leads Own ‘Revolution.’” January 26, 1970. UPA 4 Martin 112
Meyerson Papers. Box 296, folder 5. Inter-Institutional Cooperation Programs, Iran-Pahlavi 
University. University of Pennsylvania Special Collections. 
 Memorandum. Martin Meyerson and Farhang Mehr. June 19, 1973. 113
 ALMANAC, September 14, 1971. in UPA 4 Martin Meyerson Papers. Inter-Institutional 114
Cooperation Programs, Box 296. Iran- Pahlavi University II. University of Pennsylvania Special 
Collections. 
!42
he believed “more effort should be spent on implementing the Arrangement between the 
two universities.”  In June 1973, Meyerson wrote directly to Mohammad Reza Shah 115
Pahlavi, explaining how Meyerson and Harnwell were “ready to cooperate” in the 
“important undertaking” of developing advanced studies at Pahlavi University.  116
According to an Iranian ambassador, the shah responded to this summary favorably, 
expressing his “sincere desire that the strong ties which exist between Pahlavi University 
and the University of Pennsylvania continue to grow.”  The shah and Martin Meyerson 117
both wanted to see the continuation of the Pahlavi-Pennsylvania agreement.  
 What is more, during Meyerson’s visit to Pahlavi in the summer of 1973, he met 
with Chancellor Farhang Mehr, and they drafted a set of informal recommendations to 
help continue a smooth partnership between the two universities. The recommendations 
included developing the library collections at Pahlavi University, privileging exchange 
students from those two universities during admissions processes, and keeping the 
University of Pennsylvania as Pahlavi University’s main contact in America for the 
remainder of the contract.  In short, administrators at both schools maintained a 118
successful partnership through the 1970s; developers at the University of Pennsylvania 
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continued to aid educational development in Iran and received the attention and approval 
of the shah.  
 The intellectual harmony between the shah and development scholars continued 
throughout the decade. As Columbia, Chicago, and Pennsylvania continued to cultivate 
relationships with the Iranian government, scholars of MES continued to provide 
ideological and technical support for the shah.  The same year that Farah Pahlavi was 
invited to Columbia, the MEI, which sponsored weekly University Seminars attended by 
prominent executives, government officials, and foreign representatives, made the focus 
of its University Seminar series “Economic Development: Directions and Difficulties.” 
Development scholars Firouz Vakil and Hollis Chenery, another economist who worked 
at the United States Agency for International Development, were among those invited to 
speak about the past and future prospects for economic development in the Middle East 
and Iran.  Administrators and scholars at the MEI showed little signs of relinquishing 119
the development agenda they had set as early as 1955.    
 Further, academics at the MEI continued to argue that a strong central government 
endowed with oil wealth could help bring economic modernity to Iran. In 1970, Issawi 
cited petroleum as the solution to the problem of underdevelopment in the Middle East. 
He claimed that early British intervention created “a deep feeling of discouragement” in 
the Middle East and contributed to the “sucking out of vast sums from the region in the 
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form of payments and dividends.”  Issawi’s gloomy narrative of underdevelopment, 120
war, rapid population growth, and low resources abruptly ended with the discovery of oil. 
“Fortunately for the Middle East,” he concluded, “it got a second chance, in the form of 
the discovery of its oil resources and a huge amount of foreign aid, and this is enabling it 
today to carry out a new programme of industrialization and modernization of its 
economy and society.”  Petroleum was, quite literally in Issawi’s narrative, the savior of 121
the Middle East. 
 At the CMES as well, scholars of MES continued to publish works that 
commended the development of Iran through oil wealth and centralized politics. In 1971, 
economists Jahangir Amuzegar and M. Ali Fekrat, who published a book as part of a 
series on Middle Eastern studies in Chicago, elaborated potential problems with oil-
centered economies. In their work, they described the potential dangers of oil wealth. 
According to them, foreign-based industries therefore create national economies with two 
sharply distinct sectors: “a highly developed, capital-intensive, usually raw materials 
sector, and a relatively underdeveloped, slow moving indigenous sector.”  Amuzegar 122
and Fekrat believed that, if not properly integrated into the Iranian economy, the oil 
industry would simply reinforce the chasm between Iran’s traditional and traditionally-
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oriented sectors and thus fail to encourage growth evenly across all sections of Iranian 
society. 
  Amuzegar and Fekrat wrote that the degree to which the dynamic sector, or the 
petroleum industry in the case of Iran, could be integrated into the rest of the economy 
depended not only on the revenues from the foreign-financed enclave but also on the 
strength of the shah’s leadership to invest those revenues into the “traditional” and 
“domestic” sectors.  Without the benevolent yet heavy-handed direction of the shah, 123
Amuzegar and Fekrat believed that further development of the petroleum industry would 
crack the Iranian economy into two distinct sectors: “a highly developed, capital-
intensive, usually raw materials sector, and a relatively underdeveloped, slow moving 
indigenous sector.”  The strong central rule of the shah, for Amuzegar and Fekrat, 124
helped artificially link sectors of the Iranian economy such that development of the oil 
industry could encourage balanced growth. The Fekrat-Amuzegar model was a synthesis 
of the postwar development theories of Albert Hirschmann and Ragnar Nurkse.  
 While Amuzegar and Fekrat’s study connected Iran’s economic success and its 
strong central rule, other development economists drew this link even more explicitly. In 
a book review, USAID economist Maxwell Fry wrote that the analysis of Amuzegar and 
Fekrat would have been improved had they given more attention to “the economic impact 
of strong central government since the 1920s,” which endowed Iran with the appropriate 
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governance structure for acquiring and distributing large oil revenues.  Thus, George 125
Lenczowski did not depart from the mainstream trends within MES in the 1970s when he 
wrote that the shah’s rule constituted a “broad attack in every conceivable sector against 
the old ills of Iranian society,” and that the White Revolution lifted Iran out of 
“backwardness to a higher level of strength and modernity.”   126
 Despite the general intellectual harmony between American academics and the 
shah, individuals within these institutions did not unanimously support the shah and his 
relationship with American academia. Many students, for example, remained highly 
critical of the shah. In one instance, a graduate of Columbia denounced the university’s 
connection with Iran, comparing Farah Pahlavi to Eva Braun and claiming that the 
administration was “desperate for the Shah’s money.”  Student protesters at Columbia 127
and Pennsylvania also resisted the administrative connections with the shah.  However 128
forceful in their opposition to the shah’s presence on American universities, these voices 
did not prevent administrators and scholars from associating with the Iranian government.  
 Academics similarly criticized the shah’s policy goal of modernization from a 
variety of perspectives. For example, Hossein Mahdavi, a development economist from 
Harvard, laid the foundation for rentier theory in 1970 when he criticized Iran’s reliance 
 Maxwell Fry, "The Economic History of Iran 1800-1914/ Iran : Economic Development under 125
Dualistic Conditions." Economic Journal 83, no. 330 (June 1973): 616-621.
 Lenczowski, Iran Under the Pahlavis, xxii. 126
 Memorandum. July 12th, 1977. Series VIII. Box 812, Regional Institutes & Iran. University 127
Archives, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library.
 Hunger strike by Penn students in protest of the Shah and of Iranian repression, news clipping, 128
April 24th, 1978. University Archives Digital Image Collection. University of Pennsylvania 
Archives. Permanent link: http://hdl.library.upenn.edu/1017/d/archives/20070613029.
!47
on oil revenue. In 1964, Mahdavi, who disliked Pahlavi’s rule, quit the Iranian Plan 
Organization to study industrial development at Harvard University.  He theorized that 129
the government’s over-reliance on revenues from oil exportation presented a unique set of 
constraints for growth that do not exist in non-oil exporting countries. Instead of side-
stepping the problems associated with economic development, he insisted that oil wealth 
presented a new set of problems when injected into underdeveloped countries: vast 
wealth was concentrated into the hands of a small population, the state was largely 
independent from the people over which it governed, and broad sectors of the population 
were unaffected by slow-moving industrialization.  While his theory gained almost no 130
traction after its immediate release, many prominent theorists returned to it after the 
revolution. Theda Skocpol, in ‘Rentier State and Shi’a Islam,’ admitted that Mahdavi’s 
rentier thesis did much of the conceptual work for her. In 1982, Jahangir Amuzegar 
similarly questioned whether oil wealth, when combined with a strong central 
government, would be able to encourage economic growth. The fact that these scholars 
began to work with rentier theory only after the Iranian Revolution reinforces the 
argument that oil and the shah were important factors in the politics of knowledge in 
MES centers.  
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 Aside from the shah, administrators of Middle Eastern studies centers also turned 
toward oil corporations such as Exxon, Mobil, and Texaco for financial support. As J.C. 
Hurewitz explained, “the Institute in recent years has been moving away from 
dependence on the large foundations and the US government toward corporations that 
have become increasingly active in the Middle East.”  In 1973, Hurewitz wrote that the 131
initial gift from Charles Hedlund, the President of Esso Middle East, of $10,000 “literally 
left me speechless.”  After this initial donation, the administration of the MEI observed 132
that it would be useful “to use Exxon’s interest to reach out to other oil companies and 
business interest,” especially given that “Columbia was the only major school that had 
not received grants from the oil companies.”   By 1977, the yearly donations from 133
Exxon and Texaco amounted to around $30,000 in total.  Further, Texaco did not limit 134
its donations to the MEI but rather expanded “its support to the various institutes and 
expanding its involvement with other worthy causes in the Middle East.”  Exxon, 135
Mobil, and Texaco did not limit their gifts to the MEI, and continued donating to regional 
studies programs throughout the 1980s.  
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 Private interests, specifically the Iranian government and later oil corporations, 
thus became important resources for Middle Eastern studies as philanthropic foundations 
and the federal government receded their support at the beginning of the 1970s. Despite 
critical voices denouncing the shah’s participation in knowledge production in America, 
many academics within centers of MES continued to support the shah’s policy goal of 
modernization up until the Iranian revolution.  
*** 
 In 1979, the shah lost control over Iran. Despite having the support of members in 
the Johnson and Nixon administrations, his White Revolution created more social tension 
than it solved. These problems manifested themselves in the form of nation-wide protests 
that culminated in the removal of the shah in 1979 and the usurpation by Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the Islamic reactionary leader. The shah’s experiment with economic 
modernization in form of the White Revolution came to an end. 
 During the Iranian revolution, the relationship between the shah and American 
academics collapsed. The Pahlavi-Pennsylvania contract expired in 1978 and, although 
the agreement was renewed on two previous occasions, the team at Pennsylvania opted 
not to sign a new contract. Meanwhile, administrators at Columbia similarly turned away 
from Pahlavi’s regime. John Woods, a professor at the CMES, insisted that the 
administration at the University of Chicago sought to remove their association with the 
shah by claiming that the university rejected the shah’s financial support.  136
 John Woods (Professor at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies), interview by William Krause 136
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 As the Pahlavi-American academic coalition deteriorated in the wake of the 
revolution, several other fundamental changes occurred in the field of MES. In the late 
1970s, critics of Orientalism assailed the mainstream trends in their field. Journals and 
publications such as The Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), 
Khamsin, and the Review of Middle East Studies emerged throughout the 1970s, each 
elaborating a critique of what they saw as the reductive and simplistic tendencies of 
Orientalism and, by extension, MES.  Waves of new scholars such as Roger Owen and 137
Talal Assad challenged the perceived dominance of orientalist stereotypes in MES. They 
accused figures like Hamilton Gibb of being “intellectually isolated, under-critical, and 
lacking any methodological tools other than antiquated philology.”  For Khalil, too, the 138
increasing challenge of Orientalism meant turmoil in the field of MES writ large. Such a 
critique partially explains why the federal government pivoted toward think tanks in 
order to justify foreign policy expertise.  Edward Said’s 1978 publication, Orientalism, 139
was broadly influential in developing and popularizing this critique. In his book, Said 
argued that every Western academic institution, book, and image representing the Middle 
East does so in a way that reinforces the political relationship between Western colonial 
powers and Middle Eastern colonial subjects.  He attacked prominent Orientalists such 140
as Bernard Lewis, insisting that their work stereotyped and essentialized people in the 
Middle East and painted the Middle East as a timeless and unchanging region. Said’s 
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critique of the field fortuitously coincided with the collapse of the shah’s regime and, 
with it, a decade-long tradition of scholarship emphasizing the possibility of economic 
development and modernization by the shah.  
 Outside of Middle Eastern studies, the fall of the shah also coincided with the rise 
of Islamic studies in the United States. Islamic studies was the third wave of scholarship 
to cover the geographic region of the Middle East, following Orientalism and Middle 
Eastern studies. Between 1983 and 1992, several Islamic studies programs emerged in 
American universities, and the percentage of theses on Islam rose drastically during the 
Iranian revolution.  Following 9/11, that number ballooned even further with Islamic 141
studies cropping up at many major American institutions. The need to create Islamic 
studies during this period suggests that many development-oriented Middle Eastern 
studies programs were ill-equipped for the academic study of Islam.  The rise of the 142
new discipline of Islamic studies following the end of the U.S.-Iranian academic 
relationship thus suggests that Middle Eastern studies as a discipline did not sufficiently 
address the topic of religion.  
 In many ways, the unique history of Middle Eastern studies in the 1960s and 
1970s demonstrated the limitations of area studies as an academic model. Area studies, 
which emerged during and immediately after the Second World War, were intended to 
provide non-ideological and apolitical expertise to policymakers who could moreover 
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utilize that expertise to promote U.S. global hegemony during the Cold War period. There 
were many flaws in this model.  The grouping together of a host of different cultures, 
nations, and societies quickly became a political project, given that many inhabitants of 
these so-called regions do not see themselves as part of a coherent community. Thus, 
regional boundaries were drawn in relation to America rather than based on any inherent 
local continuity. Moreover, as many academics have previously suggested, to argue that 
the scholarship of area studies programs was apolitical and non-ideological would be to 
take the rhetoric of midcentury American liberalism at face value. Whether they acted as 
agents of U.S. global hegemony or voiced dissent, regionalists were often defined based 
on their relationship to America’s foreign policy apparatus and the mainstream political 
liberalism that helped inform it, both of which were ideological in nature.  Many 143
regional scholars wrote works that interested political and ideological actors.  
 Although the involvement of the state posed many problems for academia, the 
withdrawal of federal funding introduced new political challenges for both Middle 
Eastern studies and universities writ large. Many recent scholars have argued that, since 
the 1970s, colleges and universities have begun acting as neoliberal institutions by 
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regarding students as consumers and research as a private commodity. These scholars 
contend that American universities are much less concerned with economic mobility than 
they are with producing research that is useful for knowledge-based industries and 
preparing undergraduates for professional roles. Moreover, private interests such as 
corporations and foreign governments continue to contribute to universities, which have 
seen a decreased level of support from the federal government and philanthropic 
foundations. Many scholars argue that both the corporate model for higher education and 
the role of private interests in knowledge production have an adverse impact on the 
quality of scholarship produced within academic institutions.  144
 Many administrators and scholars in Middle Eastern studies programs worked 
under similar conditions in the 1970s: the withdrawal of federal and philanthropic support 
occurred in the 1970s, creating an atmosphere of deprivation that foreshadowed the 
contingency that is standard in many contemporary universities. In turn, they were forced 
to rely on private sources of support in order to keep their centers open, drawing money 
from the very regions over which they claimed expertise. In our current atmosphere of 
resource deprivation, it is becoming increasingly important to reconstruct past stories in 
which administrators and academics struggled to keep institutions afloat. With the rise of 
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contingent faculty, the increasing involvement of private interests in academic research, 
and debates regarding the role of science in national and international politics, we can 
observe uncertainty regarding the relationship between knowledge and politics in 
contemporary American society. 
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